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Abstract
In this paper we describe an approach based on open system analysis for the speciﬁcation, veriﬁcation and
synthesis of secure systems. In particular, by using our framework, we are able to model a system with a
possible intruder and verify whether the whole system is secure, i.e. whether the system satisﬁes a given
temporal logic formula that describes its secure behavior. If necessary, we are also able to automatically
synthesize a process that, by controlling the behavior of the possible intruder, enforces the desired secure
behavior of the whole system.
Keywords: open system analysis, partial model checking, secure systems analysis, synthesis of controller
operators
1 Overview
In the last few years, research on the deﬁnition of formal methods for the analysis
and the veriﬁcation of security properties of systems has increased greatly. This is
mainly due to the practical relevance of these systems and moreover to prelimin-
ary encouraging results achieved by the application of formal methods to security
analysis.
Here we describe a logical approach for speciﬁcation, veriﬁcation and synthesis
of secure systems by summarizing some results of the works [14,16,17].
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The speciﬁcation is the ﬁrst step of the analysis of a system. The language for
the description of properties and the one for the description of systems must have a
clear formal semantics. We consider for speciﬁcation both declarative languages as
temporal logic, in particular equational μ-calculus, and operational ones as process
algebras, in particular CCS (see [20]).
We then specify the security of a system as the speciﬁcation of a property of an
open system, by following the approach given in [14,16]. As a matter of fact the
analysis of security properties is based on the idea that potential attackers should
be analyzed as if they were un-speciﬁed components of a system. In this way we
reduce security analysis to the analysis of open systems. The behavior of an open
system may be not completely speciﬁed and may present some uncertainty. The
main idea underling this approach is the following: at the beginning we have a
system S and a temporal logic formula φ that describes a security property. It is
possible that an intruder X works in parallel with S or it is also possible that X
is a malicious component of S. In each of these cases we require that S composed
with X (S‖X) satisﬁes φ whatever X is.
The veriﬁcation phase requires to check for any X that (S‖X) satisﬁes the
property φ. In principle, this corresponds to an unbounded number of classical
model checking problems in closed systems 3 . Indeed, the universal quantiﬁcation
on all possible intruders makes this problem diﬃcult to manage. In order to solve
it we use the partial model checking technique. It is introduced by Andersen in [1]
in order to deal with compositional analysis of concurrent system. By using this
technique, we may focus only on X and the previous problem becomes a validity
checking problem. As a matter of fact by using the partial model checking technique,
the property φ is projected on another one, says φ′ = φ//S , depending only on S
and φ, that only the component X must satisfy. Here, there is still the universal
quantiﬁcation, but the problem is now a validity checking one, that has been solved
for many logics, including μ-calculus.
We consider the following synthesis problem. Assume to have a system S that
is secure in isolation, but that in composition with a certain component X does
not enjoy the desired security property, say φ. Then, we are able to synthesize a
process Y that controlling the component X guarantees the whole system with S
works correctly, i.e. it satisﬁes φ.
Hence we have extended the line of research of [14,16] with a method for automat-
ically enforcing the desired security properties (see [17,18,19] ). We deﬁne process
algebra operators called controller operators and denoted by Y  X where Y is the
controller program i.e. the process that controls the un-speciﬁed component X. In
particular we deﬁne controller operators that are able to model security automata
described in [3,4,22] for enforcing safety properties as well as others able to force
Non-interference properties (see [19]), under certain assumptions.
As before we start from a system S and a security property φ and we project
3 Actually, there exists a veriﬁcation problem, called module checking, i.e. model checking of open system,
introduced in [12]. Such a problem can be solved using the technique we are going to present here, e.g. see
[15].
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φ on φ′ by partial model checking. In this way we have to monitor only the neces-
sary/untrusted part of the system, here X. Then we can force X to enjoy φ′ by
using an appropriate controller Y X. Moreover, our approach permits us to auto-
matically synthesize a controller program Y for a given controller operator Y  X
by exploiting satisﬁability procedure on process algebra and temporal logic.
We also show a related speciﬁcation framework called GNDC (e.g., see [8]) that
is able to describe security properties, e.g. Non-interference, Agreement, Authen-
tication, Non-Repudiation and so on. By using this schema we are also able to
uniformly model dependable systems and analyze dependablity properties. GNDC
was ﬁrstly introduced in [8] as a framework where family of security properties could
be uniformly expressed and compared. Generally speaking a GNDC property has
the following form:
S satisﬁes GNDC
α(S)
 iﬀ ∀ X S‖X  α(S)
This means that a system S enjoys GNDC
α(S)
 iﬀ S shows w.r.t. a certain behavioral
relation 4 , the same behavior of α(S). This is must to be true even if S is composed
with a possible un-trusted component X, whatever it is. By using characteristic
formulae (e.g. see [21]) for expressing the relation , we can reduce this problem to
a usual open system analysis one.
Summing up our aim is to present a logical approach based on open system
analysis and partial model checking technique for the speciﬁcation, veriﬁcation and
synthesis of secure systems.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy recalls the basic theory
about process algebra and temporal logic. Section 3 explains our approach for the
speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of secure systems. Section 4 presents how we are able
to deﬁne and synthesize controller programs. Section 5 shows a related approach
used also to deal with dependability properties. Eventually, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Background
2.1 Process Algebra: CCS
CCS (see [20]) is a calculus for describing the behavior of concurrent processes.
The CCS language assumes a set Act = L ∪ L¯ of (observable) communication
actions built from a set L of names and a set L¯ of co-names. The purpose of putting
a line, called complementation, over a names is to show that the corresponding
action can synchronize with its complemented action. Complementation follows
the rule that a¯ = a, for any communication action a ∈ Act.
A special symbol, τ , is used to model any (unobservable) internal action; hence
the full set of possible actions is Actτ = Act ∪ {τ}. We let a, b, . . . range over
4 There are a lot of diﬀerent behavioral relations that can be studied. In particular we are interested in
simulation, bisimulation and trace equivalences.
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Preﬁxing:
a.P
a
−→ P
Choice:
P
a
−→ P ′
P + Q
a
−→ P ′
Q
a
−→ Q′
P + Q
a
−→ Q′
Parallel:
P
a
−→ P ′
P‖Q
a
−→ P ′‖Q
Q
a
−→ Q′
P‖Q
a
−→ P‖Q′
P
l
−→ P ′ Q
l¯
−→ Q′
P‖Q
τ
−→ P ′‖Q′
Restriction:
P
a
−→ P ′
P\L
a
−→ P ′\L
Relabeling:
P
a
−→ P ′
P [f ]
f(a)
−→ P ′[f ]
Constant:
P
a
−→ P ′
A
a
−→ P ′
Table 1
SOS system for CCS.
Actτ . The following grammar speciﬁes the syntax of the language deﬁning all CCS
processes:
P,Q ::= 0 | a.P | P + Q | P‖Q | P\L | P [f ] | A
where L ⊆ Act and the relabeling function f : Actτ → Actτ must be such that
f(τ) = τ .
Informally, 0 is the process that does not perform any action. a.P is the process
ready to perform the action a, then, it behaves as P . Process P + Q can choose
non-deterministically to behave either as P or as Q. P‖Q is the parallel operator
where P and Q evolve concurrently. In P\L, actions a ∈ L ∪ L¯ are prevented from
happening. P [f ] is the process obtained from P by changing each a ∈ Actτ into
f(a). A process identiﬁer A deﬁnes a process and it is assumed that each identiﬁer
A has a deﬁning equation of the form A
.
= P .
The operational semantics of CCS terms (see [20]) is described by a labeled
transition system that is a tuple (E , Actτ ,→), where E is the set of all CCS terms
and →⊆ E × Actτ × E is a transition relation deﬁned by structural induction as
the least relation generated by the set of Structural Operational Semantics (SOS)
rules of Table 1. The transition relation → deﬁnes the usual concept of derivation
in one step. As a matter of fact P
a
−→ P ′ means that process P evolves in one step
into process P ′ by executing action a ∈ Actτ . The transitive and reﬂexive closure
of
⋃
a∈Actτ
a
−→ is written →∗.
Given a CCS process P , Der(P ) = {P ′|P →∗ P ′}, is the set of its derivatives.
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A CCS process P is said ﬁnite state if Der(P ) is ﬁnite. Sort(P ) (called the sort of
P ) is the set of names of actions that syntactically appear in the process P .
2.2 Behavioral Equivalences
Several behavioral relations are deﬁned in order to compare the behavior of diﬀerent
processes.
2.2.1 Simulation and Bisimulation Equivalences
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let (E , Actτ ,→) be an LTS of concurrent processes, and let R be
a binary relation over E . Then R is called strong simulation, denoted by ≺, over
(E , Actτ ,→) if and only if, whenever (E,F ) ∈ R we have:
if E
a
−→ E′ then there exists F ′ s.t. F
a
−→ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R.
A strong bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R−1 are strong simulations.
We represent with ∼ the union of all the strong bisimulations.
We give the notion of observational relations as follows: E
τ
⇒ E′ (or E ⇒ E′)
if E
τ
→
∗
E′; for a = τ , E
a
⇒ E′ if E
τ
⇒
a
→
τ
⇒ E′ 5 . Let γ ∈ Act∗ be a sequence of
actions, i.e. γ = a1, . . . , an, then E
γ
=⇒ E′ iﬀ there exist E = E0, E1, . . . , En = E
′
s.t. E0
a1=⇒ E1 . . . En−1
an=⇒ En.
The weak bisimulation relation (see [20]) permits to abstract to some extent
from the internal behavior of the systems, represented by the internal τ action.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let (E , Actτ ,→) be an LTS of concurrent processes, and let R be
a binary relation over E . Then R is called weak simulation, denoted by , over
(E , Actτ ,→) if and only if, whenever (E,F ) ∈ R we have:
if E
a
−→ E′ then there exists F ′ s.t. F
a
=⇒ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R,
A weak bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R−1 are weak simulations. We
represent with ≈ the union of all the weak bisimulations.
Every strong simulation is also a weak one (see [20]).
2.2.2 Trace Equivalence
Most of the security properties are based on the simple notion of traces: two pro-
cesses are equivalent if they exactly show the same execution sequences (called
traces). In order to formally deﬁne traces, we deﬁne trace preorder (≤trace) and
trace equivalence (≈trace) as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.3 For any E ∈ E the set T (E) of traces associated with E is T (E) =
{γ ∈ Act∗ | ∃E′ : E
γ
=⇒ E′}. F can execute all traces of E (notation E ≤trace F )
iﬀ T (E) ⊆ T (F ). E and F are trace equivalent (notation E ≈trace F ) iﬀ E ≤trace F
and F ≤trace E, i.e. iﬀ T (E) = T (F ).
5 Note that it is a short notation for E
τ
⇒ Eτ
a
→ E′τ
τ
⇒ E′ where Eτ and E′τ denote intermediate states
that is not important for this framework.
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T′ρ = S F
′
ρ = ∅ Z
′
ρ = ρ(Z) φ1 ∧ φ2
′
ρ = φ1
′
ρ ∩ φ2
′
ρ
φ1 ∨ φ2
′
ρ = φ1
′
ρ ∪ φ2
′
ρ 〈a〉φ
′
ρ = {s | ∃s
′ : s
a
→ s′ and s′ ∈ φ′ρ}
[a]φ′ρ = {s | ∀s
′ : s
a
→ s′ implies s′ ∈ φ′ρ}
Table 2
Equational μ-calculus
2.3 Equational μ-Calculus
The equational μ-calculus is a modal logic (see [5]) based on ﬁx-point equations.
Let Z be a variable ranging over a set V of variables, a least (greatest) ﬁx-point
equation is Z =μ φ (Z =ν φ), where φ is an assertion. The syntax of assertions (φ)
and of lists of equations (D) is deﬁned as follows:
assertion φ ::= T | F | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | 〈a〉φ | [a]φ
equations list D ::= (Z =μ φ)D | (Z =ν φ)D | 

where the symbol T means true and F means false; ∧ is the symbol for the con-
junction of formulae, i.e. φ1 ∧φ2 holds iﬀ both of the formulae φ1 and φ2 hold, and
∨ is the disjunction of formulae and φ1 ∨ φ2 holds when either φ1 or φ2 holds. The
possibility operator 〈a〉φ means that “there exists a transition labeled by a after that
φ holds”. The necessity operator [a]φ means “for all a-actions performed φ holds”.
The semantics of the equational μ-calculus is deﬁned over labeled transition
systems. In order to give the semantics of an equation list we show our notation:
let M be a labeled transition system and ρ be a function, called environment, from
variables to a subset of the set of states of M, unionsq represents the union of disjoint
environments, and [] denotes the empty environment. Let σ be in {μ, ν}, σU.f(U)
represents the σ ﬁx-point of the function f in one variable U . The semantics, Dρ
is deﬁned by the following equations:

ρ = [] (Z =σ φ)Dρ = D(ρunionsq[U ′/Z]) unionsq [U
′/Z]
where U ′ = σU.φ(ρunionsq[U/Z]unionsqρ′(U)) and ρ
′(U) = D(ρunionsq[U/Z])
Informally (Z =σ φ)Dρ says that the solution to (Z =σ φ)D is the σ ﬁxed
point solution U ′ of φρ where the solution to the rest of the list of equations D
is used as environment. A labeled transition system M satisﬁes an equation list
D, written M |=ρ D ↓ Z if the initial state of M is in DρZ, where Z is the ﬁrst
variable in the list D. We omit ρ out when it is evident from the context or when
D is closed.
The semantics, φρ, of an assertion φ is deﬁned in Table 2.
The following standard result of μ-calculus will be useful in the reminder of the
paper.
Theorem 2.4 ([23]) Given a formula φ it is possible to decide in exponential time
in the length of φ if there exists a model of φ and it is also possible to give an
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example of such model.
2.4 Partial Model Checking
Partial model checking is a technique that relies upon compositional methods for
proving properties of concurrent systems [1,2].
The intuitive idea underlying the partial model checking is the following: proving
that E‖F satisﬁes φ is equivalent to prove that F satisﬁes a modiﬁed speciﬁcation
φ = φ//E , where //E is the partial evaluation function for the parallel composition
operator (see Table A.1 in Appendix) 6 .
Hence, the behavior of a component has been partially evaluated and the re-
quirements are changed in order to respect this evaluation.
We give the following main result (see [2]).
Lemma 2.5 Given a process E‖F and an equational speciﬁcation D ↓ Z we have:
E‖F |= D ↓ Z iﬀ F |= D ↓ Z//E
A lemma similar to the previous one holds for each CCS operator.
2.4.1 Characteristic Formulae
A characteristic formula is a formula in equational μ-calculus that completely char-
acterizes the behavior of a (state in a) LTS modulo a chosen notion of behavioral
relation. It is possible to deﬁne the notion of characteristic formula for a ﬁnite
state process E w.r.t. several behavioral relations (see [21]). Here we present the
deﬁnition of characteristic formula w.r.t. (weak) simulation as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.6 Given a ﬁnite state process, its characteristic formula (w.r.t. weak
simulation) DE ↓ ZE is deﬁned by the following equations: for every E
′ ∈ Der(E),
ZE′ =ν
∧
a∈Act([a](
∨
E′′:E′
a
⇒E′′
ZE′′)).
Following the reasoning used in [21], the following proposition holds.
Lemma 2.7 Let E be a ﬁnite-state process and let φE, be its characteristic formula
w.r.t. simulation, then F  E ⇔ F |= φE,.
3 Speciﬁcation and Veriﬁcation of Secure Systems
Following the approach proposed in [14,16], we describe here a methodology for the
formal analysis of secure systems based on the concept of open systems and partial
model checking technique.
6 We present the partial model checking technique w.r.t. parallel operator because its application w.r.t this
operators is more intuitive than w.r.t. another CCS operator.
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3.1 Open Systems Analysis for Security
A system is open if it has some unspeciﬁed components. We want to make sure
that the system with an unspeciﬁed component works properly, e.g. fulﬁlls a certain
property. Thus, the intuitive idea underlying the veriﬁcation of an open system is
the following:
An open system satisﬁes a property if and only if, whatever component is
substituted to the unspeciﬁed one, the whole system satisﬁes this property.
In the context of formal languages for the description of system behavior, an open
system may be simply regarded as a term of this language which may contain
“holes” (or placeholders). These are unspeciﬁed components. For instance A‖( )
and A‖B‖( ) may be considered as open systems.
The main idea is that, when analyzing security-sensitive systems, neither the
enemy’s behavior nor the malicious users’ behavior should be ﬁxed beforehand. A
system should be secure regardless of the behavior the malicious users or intruders
may have, which is exactly a veriﬁcation problem of open systems. According to
[14,16], for deﬁning security properties as open systems properties we study the
following problem:
For every component X S‖X |= φ (1)
where X stands for a possible enemy, S is the system under examination and φ is
a (temporal) logic formula expressing the security property. It roughly states that
the property φ holds for the system S, regardless of the component (i.e. intruder,
malicious user, hostile environment, etc.) which may possibly interact with it.
Our aim is to reduce such a veriﬁcation problem as in Formula (1) to a validity
checking problem. To obtain this, we apply the partial model checking techniques
as follows:
∀X S‖X |= φ iﬀ X |= φ//S (2)
In this way we ﬁnd the suﬃcient and necessary condition on X, expressed by the
logical formula φ//S , so the whole system S‖X satisﬁes φ if and only if X satisﬁes
φ//S .
Several results exist about the decidability of such problems for temporal logic
and, for several interesting properties, like several safety properties (“nothing bad
happens”), the validity problem expressed by Formula (2) may be eﬃciently solved.
4 Synthesis of Controller Programs
In previous sections we have presented our approach for analyzing secure systems as
open systems. As we have already said, the universal quantiﬁcation over all possible
intruders in Formula (1) it is not easy to manage.
Our aim in this section is to present our method to enforce a system to behave
correctly whatever the behavior of the target is. To do this we deﬁne several process
algebra controller operators that permit to control possible un-trusted behaviors of
a target. We denote them by Y  X, where X is the target and Y is a controller
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program i.e. the process that controls X in order to guarantee that a given security
property is satisﬁed.
By using a controller operator the speciﬁcation of the system changes from
Formula (1) to:
∃Y ∀X s.t. S‖(Y  X) |= φ (3)
By partially evaluating φ w.r.t. S the Formula (3) is reduced as follows:
∃Y ∀X Y  X |= φ′ (4)
where φ′ = φ//S .
It is important to note that, by using partial model checking we need to control
only the possible un-trusted component of the system. This is an advantage of our
approach because often not all the system needs to be checked or it is simply not
convenient to check it as a whole or also it is not possible to do. Some components
could be trusted and one would like to have a method to constrain only the un-
trusted ones (e.g. downloaded applets). Our method allows one to monitor only
the necessary/untrusted part of the system, here X. Sometimes it could be possible
that not the whole system can be checked but only some of its components.
Moreover, for some security properties, we are able to automatically synthesize
a controller program for a controller operator.
4.1 Controller Operators
We can deﬁne several kinds of controller operators. Each of them has diﬀerent
capabilities. For instance, in [17,18,19] we have dealt with security automata (trun-
cation, suppression, insertion, edit) deﬁned in [3,4] by modeling them by process
algebra controller operators Y K X, where K ∈ {T, S, I,E}
7 .
Referring to [3,4], we recall the informal deﬁnition of security automata as fol-
lows:
Truncation automata: The truncation automaton (similar to Schneider’s ones
(see [22])) can recognize bad sequences of actions and halt the program execution
before security property is violated, but cannot otherwise modify the program
behavior.
Suppression automata: The suppression automaton can halt program execution
and suppress individual program actions without terminating the program out-
right.
Insertion automata: The insertion automaton can insert a sequence of actions
into the program actions stream as well as terminate the program.
Edit automata: The edit automaton combines the power of suppression and inser-
tion automata. It can truncate actions sequences and insert or suppress security-
relevant actions at will.
7 T stays for Truncation, S for Suppression, I for Insertion and E for Edit.
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According to [3,4], these operators are applied in order to enforce safety properties.
As a matter of fact for this class of formulae it is possible to prove that if E and
F are two processes, s.t. F  E then E |= φ ⇒ F |= φ. In [18] we have proven
that Y T X is weakly similar to Y . Hence, in order to satisfy the Formula (4) it is
suﬃcient to prove the following one:
∃Y Y |= φ′ (5)
In this case we obtain a satisﬁability problem in μ-calculus, that can be solved by
Theorem 2.4. Hence we are able to ﬁnd a process Y that halts the execution of the
target whenever it is unsafe.
It is important to note that a similar result can be proven also for the other
controller operators. As a matter of fact, by deﬁning appropriate relabeling function
fK , we have proven that Y K X is weakly similar to Y [fK ] for K ∈ {S, I,E}. So,
by partial model checking w.r.t. relabeling operator (see Table A.1 in Appendix)
we are able to calculate φ′′ = φ//[fK ]
to reduce Formula (4) as follows:
∃Y Y |= φ′′ 8 (6)
Also in this case we can solve the problem by Theorem 2.4.
Other controller operators can be deﬁned in order, for example, to enforce not
only safety properties but also information ﬂow properties (see [19]).
5 A General Schema for Security and Dependability
Properties: The GNDC Schema
Referring to the open system approach deﬁned before, here we present a gen-
eral schema to specify several security properties. It is called Generalized NDC,
GNDCα for short, where  and α are two parameters that express a behavioral
equivalence and a property respectively. (It is a generalization of Non Deducibility
on Compositions,NDC for short, (see [6]).) This general schema permits to study
relationships among diﬀerent security properties in a fairly simple way. Indeed, their
comparison can be carried out by simply studying the relations among the relative
α’s and ’s. It is worth noticing that some of the properties we consider have been
proposed for completely diﬀerent aims. For instance, NDC has been introduce for
studying non-interference properties in non-deterministic systems while Agreement
has been proposed for the analysis of entity authentication in protocols.
The idea is similar to the one of the analysis as open systems, but it considers
as correct speciﬁcation of the behavior another process rather than a formula.
The main idea is that a system E is GNDCα

iﬀ for every process X the com-
position of the system with such a X satisﬁes a speciﬁcation α(E). Essentially,
GNDCα

guarantees that the property identiﬁed by α is satisﬁed, w.r.t.  relation
even when the system is composed with any possibly hostile process.
8 The interested reader can ﬁnd more details in [18].
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Deﬁnition 5.1 E is GNDCα

iﬀ
∀X E‖X\H  α(E)
The property is parametric with respect to α(E) and  that can be instantiated
in order to obtain diﬀerent security properties. In particular α : E → E is a func-
tion between processes and α(E), w.r.t. a given E, speciﬁes which should be the
“correct” (intended) behavior of E;  ⊂ E × E is a relation between processes that
represents our notion of “observation”. The idea is that just by studying diﬀerent
α functions, one could compare diﬀerent properties. This has been useful to form-
ally show, as the intuition suggests, that non-interference properties are usually the
strongest ones. (The interested reader may check [7] for a deeper discussion.)
As a matter of fact, we can instantiate the GNDC schema to obtain several
properties. For instance, we can deﬁne NDC, BNDC, Agreement, authentication
and non-repudiation by choosing particular instances of  and α(E).
Example 5.2 As we have already said, Non Deducibility on Compositions, NDC
for short, (see [6]) has been proposed as a generalization of the classical idea of
Non-Interference (see [10]) to non-deterministic systems.
Since GNDCα

is a generalization of NDC, it can be instantiated in order to ob-
tain NDC and also the bisimulation based NDC, called BNDC. We ﬁrst redeﬁne
in our extended language the original deﬁnition as follows:
E is NDC iﬀ ∀ Π ∈ High users , E‖Π\H ≈trace E\H w.r.t. Low users
where H is a set of high actions. NDC requires that high level processes Π are
not able to change the low level behavior of the system represented by E\H. As a
matter of fact E \H is the system where no high level activity is allowed. If it is
equivalent to E‖Π\H this clearly means that Π is not able to modify in any way
the execution of E.
We can obtain a bisimulation based NDC by simply substituting ≈trace with
≈.
E is BNDC iﬀ ∀ Π ∈ High users , E \H ≈ E‖Π \H.
Note that NDC and BNDC correspond to GNDC
E\H
≈trace and GNDC
E\H
≈ , respect-
ively.
Example 5.3 The approach proposed in [13] for the analysis of authentication
properties, inside the framework of CSP [11] process algebra, can be rephrased in
terms of our speciﬁcation schema. The basic idea of the Agreement property is the
following:
“A protocol guarantees to an initiator A agreement with a responder B on a set of
data items ds if, whenever A (acting as initiator) completes a run of the protocol,
apparently with responder B, then B has previously been running the protocol,
apparently with A, and B was acting as responder in his run, and the two agents
agreed on the data values corresponding to all the variables in ds, and each such
run of A corresponds to a unique run of B”.
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What is technically done in the agreement property is to have for each party an
action representing the running of the protocol and another one representing the
completion of it. Hence
E satisﬁes Agreement iﬀ E is GNDC
αAgree(E)
≤trace
.
where αAgree says that even in the presence of an hostile process, E does not execute
wrong traces.
The universal quantiﬁcation over all possible intruders is yet problematic when
trying to check a property, since, in principle, we have to verify it over inﬁnitely
many processes, one for each intruder.
The GNDC schema has a favorite veriﬁcation method based on the so-called
most-general intruder idea. For several kind of relations, it is possible to avoid the
universal quantiﬁcation and just consider one possible intruder. Thus, standard
techniques and tools may be applied. Unfortunately, for several interesting proper-
ties, e.g. BNDC, such approach does not work and the one based on logic presented
in the previous sections should be applied.
5.1 Related Problems: GNDC in Dependability
It is possible to show that also dependable systems can be uniformly modeled in
our framework and also dependablity properties can be analyzed within GNDC
(see [9]). A system must be modeled by CCS, where both the failing behavior
of the system and the related fault-recovering procedures are explicitly described.
The environment acts as a fault-injector and it is the unspeciﬁed component of our
framework. We call it faulty environment. We may note that the neat separation
between the system and its environment given by GNDC is very useful.
The GNDC schema can be exploited for expressing properties peculiar of de-
pendability analysis as fail stop, fail safe, fail silent (see [9] for the details). We
brieﬂy recall some deﬁnitions:
A failing system model is a CCS process PF obtained by extending the process
P with the possibility of executing particular external actions from a set F of
possible fault actions. After each fault action, the relative failure mode is also
speciﬁed in PF .
A fault tolerant system model is a CCS process P#F obtained by adding to
PF some processes realizing error-recover strategies in accordance to some fault
tolerant design strategy.
Occurrences of faults are induces by a fault-injector process FF that causes
faults to happen. It interacts with P#F exactly through f ∈ F fault actions.
Now we are able to give the characterization of fault tolerance as GNDC property
as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.4 A process P satisﬁes GNDC
α(P )
 iﬀ ∀FF ∈ EF (P
#
F ‖FF )\Fα(P
#
F )
where EF = {X|Sort(X) ⊆ F ∪ {τ}}.
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It is important to observe that the clear separation between the system model
and the environment allows us to leave FF unspeciﬁed and to range it over EF .
As we have already said, diﬀerent deﬁnitions of α(P ) characterize diﬀerent fault
tolerance properties, e.g. fail stop, fail safe, fail silent and fault tolerance.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how security properties can be conveniently speciﬁed as
properties of open systems. Moreover, these properties can be veriﬁed in a uniform
way by using a few concepts of concurrency and temporal logic theory, as, for
instance, partial model checking. Logic provides rigorous methods to reason about
the uncertainty of the execution environment of security systems. The synthesis
of secure systems is also possible by means of logical techniques. More generally,
we aim at providing a uniform approach for the speciﬁcation\analysis\synthesis for
several application areas, e.g. fault-tolerance, non-interference, network and system
security, open systems analysis and so on.
References
[1] Andersen, H., “Veriﬁcation of Temporal Properties of Concurrent Systems,” Ph.D. thesis, Department
of Computer Science, Aarhus University, Denmark (1993).
[2] Andersen, H. R., Partial Model Checking (Extended Abstract), in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual IEEE
Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1995, pp. 398–407.
[3] Bauer, L., J. Ligatti and D. Walker, More Enforceable Security Policies, in: I. Cervesato, editor,
Foundations of Computer Security: Proceedings of the FLoC’02 workshop on Foundations of Computer
Security (2002), pp. 95–104.
[4] Bauer, L., J. Ligatti and D. Walker, Edit Automata: Enforcement Mechanisms for Run-time Security
Policies, International Journal of Information Security 4 (2005), pp. 2–16.
[5] Bradﬁeld, J. and C. Stirling, “Modal logics and mu-calculi: an introduction,” Handbook of Process
Algebra. Elsevier, 2001.
[6] Focardi, R. and R. Gorrieri, A Classiﬁcation of Security Properties for Process Algebras, Journal of
Computer Security 3 (1994/1995), pp. 5–33.
[7] Focardi, R., R. Gorrieri and F. Martinelli, Classiﬁcation of Security Properties – Part II: Network
Security, in: Tutorial Lectures of the International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and
Design (FOSAD’02), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2946, 2004, pp. 139–185.
[8] Focardi, R. and F. Martinelli, A Uniform Approach for the Deﬁnition of Security Properties, in: FM’99:
Proceedings of the Wold Congress on Formal Methods in the Development of Computing Systems–
Volume I, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1708 (1999), pp. 794–813.
[9] Gnesi, S., G. Lenzini and F. Martinelli, Applying Generalized Non Deducibility on Compositions
(GNDC) Approach in Dependability, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 99 (2004),
pp. 111–126.
[10] Goguen, J. A. and J. Meseguer, Security Policy and Security Models, in: Proceedings of the 1982
Symposium on Security and Privacy (1982), pp. 11–20.
[11] Hoare, C. A. R., “Communicating Sequential Processes,” Prentice-Hall, 1985.
[12] Kupferman, O. and M. Y. Vardi, Module checking, in: Rajeev Alur and Thomas A. Henzinger, editors,
Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 1102 (1996), pp. 75–86.
[13] Lowe, G., A Hierarchy of Authentication Speciﬁcation, in: Proceedings of the 10th Computer Security
Foundation Workshop (1997), pp. 31–43.
F. Martinelli, I. Matteucci / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168 (2007) 29–43 41
[14] Martinelli, F., “Formal Methods for the Analysis of Open Systems with Applications to Security
Properties,” Ph.D. thesis, University of Siena (1998).
[15] Martinelli, F., Module Checking through Partial Model Checking, Technical Report 2002-TR-06, IIT–
CNR (2002).
[16] Martinelli, F., Analysis of security protocols as open systems, Theoretical Computer Science 290 (2003),
pp. 1057–1106.
[17] Martinelli, F. and I. Matteucci, Modeling Security Automata with process algebras and related results
(2006), presented at the 6th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS’06) –
Informal proceedings.
[18] Martinelli, F. and I. Matteucci, Through modeling to Synthesis of Security Automata, in: Proceedings
of the 2nd International Workshop on Security and Trust Management (STM’06), Electronic Notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, 2006.
[19] Matteucci, I., Automated synthesis of enforcing mechanisms for security properties in a timed setting,
in: Proceedings of the Workshop on Information and Computer Security (ICS’06), Electronic Notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, 2006.
[20] Milner, R., “Communicating and mobile systems: the π-calculus,” Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[21] Mu¨ller-Olm, M., Derivation of Characteristic Formulae, in: MFCS’98 Workshop on Concurrency,
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 18 (1998).
[22] Schneider, F. B., Enforceable security policies, ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
3 (2000), pp. 30–50.
[23] Street, R. S. and E. A. Emerson, An automata theoretic procedure for the propositional μ-calculus,
Information and Computation 81 (1989), pp. 249–264.
F. Martinelli, I. Matteucci / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168 (2007) 29–4342
A Tables of Partial Model Checking Function
Parallel:
(D↓ Z)//t = (D//t)↓ Zt 
//t = 

(Z =σ φD)//t = ((Zs =σ φ//s)s∈Der(E))(D)//t Z//t = Zt
[a]φ//s = [a](φ//s) ∧
∧
s
a
−→s′
φ//s′, if a = τ φ1 ∧ φ2//s = (φ1//s) ∧ (φ2//s)
〈a〉φ//s = 〈a〉(φ//s) ∨
∨
s
a
−→s′
φ//s′, if a = τ φ1 ∨ φ2//s = (φ1//s) ∨ (φ2//s)
[τ ]φ//s = [τ ](φ//s) ∧
∧
s
τ
−→s′
φ//s′ ∧
∧
s
a
−→s′
[a](φ //s′)
〈τ〉φ//s = 〈τ〉(φ//s) ∨
∨
s
τ
−→s′
φ//s′ ∨
∨
s
a
−→s′
〈a¯〉(φ//s′) T//s = T F//s = F
Restriction:
Z//\L = Z (Z =σ φD)//\L = (Z =σ φ//\L(D)//\L)
〈a〉φ//\L =
⎧⎨
⎩
〈a〉(φ//\L) if a ∈ L ∪ L¯
F if a ∈ L
[a]φ//\L =
⎧⎨
⎩
[a](φ//\L) if a ∈ L ∪ L¯
T if a ∈ L
φ1 ∧ φ2//\L = (φ1//\L) ∧ (φ2//\L) φ1 ∨ φ2//\L = (φ1//\L) ∨ (φ2//\L)
T//\L = T F//\L = F
Relabeling:
Z//[f ] = Z (Z =σ φD)//[f ] = (Z =σ φ//[f ](D)//[f ])
〈a〉φ//[f ] =
∨
b:f(b)=a〈b〉(φ//[f ]) [a]φ//[f ] =
∧
b:f(b)=a[b](φ//[f ])
φ1 ∧ φ2//[f ] = (φ1//[f ]) ∧ (φ2//[f ]) φ1 ∨ φ2//[f ] = (φ1//[f ]) ∨ (φ2//[f ])
T//[f ] = T F//[f ] = F
Table A.1
Partial evaluation function for parallel operator and relabeling operator.
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